The Middle Kingdom Returns to the Sea, While America Turns Its Back—How China Came to Dominate the Global Maritime Industry, and the Implications for the World by McMahon, Christopher J.
Naval War College Review 
Volume 74 
Number 2 Spring 2021 Article 7 
2021 
The Middle Kingdom Returns to the Sea, While America Turns Its 
Back—How China Came to Dominate the Global Maritime 
Industry, and the Implications for the World 
Christopher J. McMahon 
The U.S. Naval War College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review 
Recommended Citation 
McMahon, Christopher J. (2021) "The Middle Kingdom Returns to the Sea, While America Turns Its 
Back—How China Came to Dominate the Global Maritime Industry, and the Implications for the World," 
Naval War College Review: Vol. 74 : No. 2 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu. 
Christopher J. McMahon is a commissioned rear 
admiral in the U.S. Maritime Service and holds the 
Maritime Administration Emory S. Land Chair of 
Merchant Marine Affairs at the Naval War College.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2021, Vol. 74, No. 2
1
McMahon: The Middle Kingdom Returns to the Sea, While America Turns Its Ba
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
THE MIDDLE KINGDOM RETURNS TO THE SEA, 
WHILE AMERICA TURNS ITS BACK
How China Came to Dominate the Global Maritime Industry, and 
the Implications for the World
Christopher J. McMahon
The condition of the American Merchant Marine is such as to call for 
immediate remedial action by the Congress. It is discreditable to us as a 
Nation that our merchant marine should be utterly insignificant in com-
parison to that of other nations we overtop in other forms of business. 
We should no longer submit to conditions under which only a trifling 
portion of our great commerce is carried in our own ships. To remedy 
this state of things would not merely serve to build up our shipping in-
terests, but it would also result in benefit to all who are interested in the 
permanent establishment of a wide market for American products, and 
would provide an auxiliary force for the Navy.
PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT,  
ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, 1901
Command of the marine transportation system has long acted as the 
stage on which great powers compete. . . . The infrastructure facilitating 
the transport of maritime commerce—ocean-going vessels, deep-water 
ports, high-speed railways, and fiber optic cables—descend from tech-
nologies Western powers once leveraged in the 19th and 20th centuries 
to expand their access to foreign markets. Today, the MSR [China’s 
Maritime Silk Road] mimics these strategies, for example, by building 
railways in Africa or laying transoceanic data cables. In some locations, 
new MSR projects are literally replacing colonial projects. The MSR is 
a strategic economic policy, intended to promote the Chinese workforce, 
build bilateral ties, foster dependence, and ensure near-exclusive access 
to foreign ports for Chinese controlled or affiliated vessels. . . . Through 
MSR projects, China can advance both economic and non-economic 
objectives simultaneously.
REPRESENTATIVE SEAN PATRICK MALONEY (D-NY), CHAIR,  
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND  
MARINE TRANSPORTATION, 17 OCTOBER 2019
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 Since the founding of the United States during the Revolutionary War, nearly every president has recognized and called for congressional support of a strong 
U.S. maritime industry.1 As the United States supposedly is a maritime nation 
with a massive international trading economy, it seems obvious that control of, 
or at least strong influence over, America’s seagoing supply chains is important.2 
Through the first half of the nineteenth century, the U.S. Merchant Marine was 
one of the largest and most efficient of its kind in the world—partly because of 
public and political support.3 In those decades U.S.-flag clipper ships dominated 
many trades, including—ironically—the China trade. But the second half of that 
century saw the industry go into steep decline—in some measure because politi-
cal support had evaporated. For economic and strategic reasons during the first 
half of the twentieth century—specifically, immediately prior to World Wars I 
and II—Congress intervened, taking critical steps to support the industry. But 
today that past support of the industry has disappeared once again, and the U.S. 
maritime industry engaged in international trade is in a perilous state of affairs. 
This has occurred as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become, by far, the 
leading commercial maritime power in the world.
The lack of a vibrant U.S. maritime industry engaged in worldwide trade places 
the strategic and economic interests of the United States and its allies in grave 
jeopardy. This is particularly so given that the PRC now dominates most sectors 
of the world’s maritime industry, and consolidation in all sectors is occurring at a 
rapid rate that benefits the PRC. The influence and the effectiveness of the PRC’s 
political and governmental intervention and funding in all sectors of China’s 
maritime industry are causing numerous other companies in the global industry 
simply to cease operations or suffer absorption by Chinese companies. There is 
a strong prospect that within little more than a decade, or even sooner, China 
virtually will control the world’s seagoing supply chain. The consequences of this 
happening for the United States and the world as a whole are staggering. As a na-
tion dependent on maritime transportation for its economy and for the movement 
of its military forces, the United States must take decisive and immediate steps to 
promote the reestablishment of U.S.-flag shipping and further enable all sectors of 
the U.S. maritime industry to compete in a significant way in the global industry.
ONCE UPON A TIME
It was the winter of 1979–80. A buzz was going around the offices of the New 
Orleans–based Lykes Brothers Steamship Company (also known as Lykes Lines) 
and through its fleet of forty-five vessels. Word had it that SS Letitia Lykes was 
loading full and down on the West Coast of the United States with eighteen thou-
sand tons of cargo bound for Shanghai, China. Letitia would be the first U.S.-flag 
3
McMahon: The Middle Kingdom Returns to the Sea, While America Turns Its Ba
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 M C M A H O N  8 3
ship to call on a mainland Chinese port since World War II. This event was the 
result of the ongoing rapprochement between the PRC and the United States that 
followed President Richard M. Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972 and follow-
on efforts by Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter. The opening of this 
new market indeed was cause for celebration.4
At the time, Lykes was one of dozens of U.S.-flag ocean-shipping companies. 
With its forty-five vessels, Lykes was one of the larger U.S. companies, but not the 
largest; that honor fell to SeaLand Services Corporation, which in 1979 was by 
far the largest container-shipping company in the world. But in 1980, even with 
more than 860 merchant ships, the U.S.-flag industry operated only about 3.8 
percent of the world’s merchant vessels, which then totaled about 22,872 ships.5 
That percentage was down from a 1946 high, when the United States operated 
some 70 percent of the world’s commercial shipping.6 By 1960, this number had 
fallen to 16.9 percent of the world’s fleet. Even so, in 1980 U.S.-flag shipping still 
was significant. Plus, the U.S. maritime industry had made massive technological 
innovations that revolutionized the industry, such as the introduction of con-
tainer shipping and lighter-aboard-ship (or LASH) vessels.
SS Letitia Lykes, like all Lykes ships, had been built in a U.S. shipyard, sup-
ported by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) through the Construction 
Differential Subsidy (CDS) program. U.S.-flag shipping companies were owned 
and operated by American citizens without any foreign corporate interests in-
volved. Profits stayed in the United States. U.S. shipping companies, particularly 
SeaLand Services, owned or leased and operated dozens of container terminals 
in U.S. ports and in ports throughout the world. While the United States at the 
time was in the process of implementing a treaty to turn over operation of the 
Panama Canal to Panama, the United States still exercised significant influence 
in the canal’s affairs.7
Although in these years the United States did not possess the largest merchant 
marine in the world, the size and influence of its industry still were considerable 
in global maritime affairs, and with its large navy the United States rightfully 
could be called a maritime nation, according to the criteria of naval historian 
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, as laid out in his influential book The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660‒1783. Mahan believed that history 
demonstrated that a truly maritime nation required a sizable merchant marine 
in addition to a powerful navy.8
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SUPPORT FOR THE U.S.-FLAG  
SHIPPING INDUSTRY
In the decades leading to World War I, American agricultural and industrial 
exports increased dramatically and America became the leading economic 
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superpower, even as the U.S. Merchant Marine continued to decline. Americans 
and American-owned businesses were confident that inexpensive foreign-flag 
shipping would remain bountiful and readily available as needed to provide the 
seagoing logistics the nation required. This proved to be a false assumption. With 
the outbreak of war in 1914, the American economy, dependent on international 
trade, suffered from a lack of availability of commercial ships. The European na-
tions that had provided the commercial sealift for the American economy with-
drew their vessels for political reasons and for wartime purposes. This caused 
widespread disruption in trade; manufactured products piled up on American 
docks, in railcars, and in warehouses, and agricultural goods spoiled because 
they could not be brought to overseas markets. The American economy suffered 
greatly because of the lack of available commercial shipping.9
The extent of the damage to the American economy caused by the shortage of 
U.S.-flag shipping in 1914 was so serious that Congress finally decided to act, but 
this took time, and the insufficiency of commercial shipping continued to im-
peril the economy. Following numerous and lengthy hearings, Congress passed 
the Shipping Act of 1916, which created the United States Shipping Board. The 
board was designed specifically to promote and assist the U.S. Merchant Marine. 
By the time the board was fully established, however, it was apparent the United 
States would enter the war soon. This placed the board on a wartime footing. In 
October 1917, the board requisitioned the entire U.S. Merchant Marine.10
In 1917, the Shipping Board initiated a huge shipbuilding program through 
the creation of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. Eventually, the board con-
tracted for more than 1,700 merchant vessels. Despite this unprecedented effort, 
only 107 ships were delivered before the armistice was signed in November 
1918. However, the remaining vessels were completed by 1922, and it was hoped 
that U.S.-flag companies would purchase them, and some did. Following World 
War I, the United States ranked number one in the world, at least in numbers of 
potentially available merchant ships. But the country never followed through on 
this advantage.11 By the 1930s, the U.S. Merchant Marine again was in a perilous 
condition owing to political neglect. And ominously, the challenges of World War 
II were on the horizon.
Other legislation that attempted to support U.S.-flag shipping included the 
so-called Jones Act. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Pub. L. No. 66-261) was 
sponsored by Senator Wesley L. Jones from Washington State. A major purpose 
of the act was to support the rights of American seafarers by solidifying laws 
passed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, the 
act gave seafarers the right to sue their employer for workplace (shipboard) in-
juries. A second provision of the act would establish procedures for transferring 
the U.S. government‒owned merchant vessels built in response to World War I to 
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private ownership. The lessons learned from World War I included recognition 
that the U.S. Merchant Marine was critical to national security. The preamble to 
the Jones Act included the following summary: “It is hereby declared the policy 
of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage 
the maintenance of a merchant marine . . . sufficient to carry the greater portion 
of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or na-
tional emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated by citizens of the United 
States.”12
As one way to support and maintain the U.S. Merchant Marine, the Jones Act 
also renewed cabotage legislation that Congress had established and maintained 
during the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth. The policy 
required trade between U.S. ports to be restricted to U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, U.S.-
flag, and U.S.-crewed merchant ships. (The very first piece of legislation that 
Congress passed under the Constitution, in April 1789, established a tariff on im-
ported goods to protect U.S.-flag shipping. This was followed by the Navigation 
Act of 1817, which expressly excluded foreign-flag vessels from trading between 
U.S. ports.)13 Cabotage legislation, including the Jones Act, always has ensured 
that there are U.S.-flag vessels to serve coastal, inland, and island trades, and it 
has continued to provide jobs for mariners, who then have been available to serve 
on strategic sealift vessels in times of national emergency. But this legislation was 
suspended prior to World War I because of the lack of U.S.-flag ships.
The key legislation that clearly defined support for the U.S. Merchant Marine 
in the twentieth century was the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. From the time the 
law was enacted through the next forty-five years, the U.S. Merchant Marine en-
joyed generally strong support from Congress and presidential administrations. 
The act established the U.S. Maritime Commission (later renamed the Maritime 
Administration). It established the CDS program, which provided funds to sup-
port the construction of ships in U.S. shipyards. The act also established operat-
ing differential subsidies (ODSs), which provided funds to enable and encourage 
shipping companies to operate their ships under the U.S. flag. Finally, the act es-
tablished the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, an institution dedicated to educat-
ing and training merchant marine officers. It is not an exaggeration to state that 
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 played a pivotal role in preparing the United 
States for World War II and, following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the quick con-
struction of the largest and most capable merchant marine the world had ever 
seen, despite huge losses of ships and mariners during the early years of the war.14
In an effort to support U.S.-flag shipping further, Congress passed two com-
panion bills in 1954, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
(Pub. L. No. 83-480) and the Cargo Preference Act (Pub. L. No. 83-664), which re-
quired a percentage of government-impelled cargo, such as food aid, to be carried 
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on U.S.-flag ships.15 These requirements, overseen by MARAD, have guaranteed 
cargoes for U.S.-flag ships and provided financial support for the industry.
With the support of Republican president Nixon, a Democratic Congress 
passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. This legislation increased the subsidies 
provided by MARAD’s CDS program, which substantially increased the con-
struction rate of new merchant ships in U.S. shipyards, yielding dozens of ships. 
As a result, relatively large numbers of new and technically innovative ships 
joined the U.S.-flag fleet in the 1970s, and the shipbuilding industry in these 
years was particularly healthy, as was the U.S. maritime industry in general.16 
Many of these same shipyards built warships for the Navy, and the large numbers 
of both commercial and Navy contracts enabled economies of scale that allowed 
shipyards to build vessels at lower per-ship costs.17
THE GLOBAL MARITIME WORLD CHANGES—THE U.S. MARITIME 
INDUSTRY TODAY
When SS Letitia Lykes departed Shanghai on the transit back to the United States 
from its historic voyage in the spring of 1980, its cargo holds were nearly empty. 
In those years, the Chinese had little to sell to a U.S. market. With only twenty-
six PRC-flag vessels in international trade, the Chinese shipping industry was 
equally insignificant.18 While Chinese shipyards built some small coastal trading 
vessels and fishing boats, they produced no large vessels. There were few or no 
Chinese companies operating in other countries, and certainly no Chinese com-
panies operating ports and terminals outside China.
What a difference forty years makes! The U.S. maritime industry has retreated 
on all fronts, whereas the Chinese industry has exploded in size to become, by 
far, the largest in the world, in nearly every category. This has been the result of 
public, corporate, and political apathy in the United States and quite the opposite 
in China; in the latter, government and industry have partnered for decades to 
implement strategic plans to grow all sectors of the industry. In the United States, 
it also is the result of a public and political lack of understanding of the role the 
maritime industry plays in the strategic and economic health of the nation. The 
U.S. maritime industry engaged in worldwide trade had been in decline since 
World War II; however, those American companies still operating ships in inter-
national trade into the 1980s entered a steep decline at that time, eventually going 
bankrupt and ceasing operations.
When the Reagan administration came into office in 1981 it almost imme-
diately eliminated the CDS shipbuilding program provided by the Merchant 
Marine Acts of 1936 and 1970. Over the next several years, this action, in turn, 
forced the closure of numerous commercial shipbuilding companies across 
America. In 1975, U.S. shipyards produced seventy deep-sea commercial ships.19 
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The Reagan administration’s abolition of the CDS program crippled the industry. 
Today no subsidies are provided to build vessels in U.S. shipyards. As a result, 
only a few shipyards remain in the United States that are capable of building 
deep-sea commercial ships, and the future financial health of these remaining 
yards is in question. The only commercial ships built after 1980 have been for 
Jones Act trades, which require ships built in U.S. shipyards.
In 2016, the number of commercial ships constructed in U.S. yards averaged 
only five vessels per year during the previous five years, in a context of a world-
wide production average of 1,408 vessels per year.20 Ironically, whereas to some 
the elimination of shipbuilding subsidies had the apparent effect of reducing 
costs to the taxpayer, the actual impact may be the opposite. Navy vessels and 
Jones Act vessels were and still are required to be built in U.S. shipyards, but 
with fewer shipyards building fewer vessels, economies of scale could not be 
realized, so the unit cost of each ship became far greater.21 Between 1987 and 
1992, an average of fewer than two commercial seagoing vessels were built per 
year; as noted, between 2010 and 2016, the average was five.22 Equally serious 
has been the loss of shipbuilding infrastructure and shipbuilding jobs, with a 
concurrent loss of shipbuilding skills and expertise. These are capabilities that 
cannot be turned on with the flick of a switch.
Since 1980, the size of the U.S.-flag fleet in international trade likewise has 
declined dramatically. In the early years of the Reagan administration, actions 
were taken to eliminate the ODS that enabled many companies to conduct opera-
tions under the U.S. flag.23 These subsidies were provided by contract, so these 
payments had to be phased out over time as contracts expired. As ODS con-
tracts were not renewed, the majority of U.S.-flag companies ceased operations 
or simply went bankrupt. This created a crisis for the military, which requires 
a capable U.S. Merchant Marine to carry equipment and supplies in the event 
of a national emergency. To remedy this situation, the Department of Defense 
spent billions of dollars to purchase and convert dozens of older, foreign-owned, 
-built, and -operated vessels, which were placed in a Ready Reserve Force (RRF) 
maintained and operated by MARAD (since 1981 part of the U.S. Department 
of Transportation).24 In addition—and with the urging of the Defense Depart-
ment—Congress in 1996 established the Maritime Security Program (MSP), 
which MARAD manages. MSP essentially provides a subsidy for sixty U.S.-flag 
ships—notably similar to the original ODS program created by the Merchant Ma-
rine Act of 1936.25 Currently, the MSP program is funded at five million dollars 
per ship, per year.26 Considering the high cost of establishing and maintaining 
the RRF in combination with the MSP program, it is questionable whether the 
taxpayers benefited at all from the elimination of the ODS program; the reverse 
probably is true. In any case, the results have included the loss of nearly all U.S. 
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shipping companies, a great reduction in the number of U.S.-flag vessels, and the 
loss of thousands of skilled mariner jobs.
The MSP law requires that U.S.-flag vessels be owned and operated by a U.S. 
company under the management of U.S. citizens, and the sixty MSP ships indeed 
are “owned and operated” by U.S. companies registered in the United States. 
However, nearly every one of these sixty ships is owned by a U.S. company that is 
merely a subsidiary of a foreign company—and the parent companies and their 
countries may have interests different from those of the United States. Accord-
ing to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
in 2018 there were 94,169 commercial deep-sea vessels in the world, of which 
50,732 were merchant ships.27 Today, including the sixty MSP vessels, there are 
only about eighty U.S.-flag vessels operating in international trade.28
As if political reversal of support for the U.S. Merchant Marine were not 
enough to decimate the U.S.-flag industry, attacks on the cabotage provisions of 
the Jones Act—periodically vigorous—have reached a new height in the last two 
years. Spearheaded by the Cato Institute and other special-interest groups, efforts 
have been made in the form of dozens of articles, conferences, and even recent 
proposed legislation on Capitol Hill to overturn the law.29 While presenting no 
substantive and verified cost data to show that the Jones Act causes significant 
financial burdens to U.S. consumers in states, commonwealths, and territories 
served by the act compared with using foreign-flag carriers, Jones Act detractors 
fail to understand the law’s strategic importance. First, elimination of the Jones 
Act poses the possibility of causing Jones Act companies to cease operating under 
the U.S. flag, thus further reducing the number of available U.S. merchant ships. 
(This would be particularly true if foreign-flag companies, subsidized by their 
governments, were allowed to enter Jones Act—that is, domestic American—
trades.) Second, with the loss of the jobs that Jones Act companies now provide, 
the pool of qualified U.S. merchant mariners virtually would disappear. This 
would make it impossible to crew the ships of the RRF and other strategic sealift 
vessels. This in turn would cripple military logistics, which is dependent on these 
ships in a national emergency. From a security standpoint, overturning the Jones 
Act has the potential to enable foreign companies (particularly those subsidized 
by their governments) effectively to assume control of inland transportation 
in the United States, with the result that thousands of foreign nationals would 
be operating vessels inside the United States—a potential security nightmare. 
Finally, under similar laws, U.S. airlines are afforded the same protections the 
U.S. maritime industry enjoys under the Jones Act. Some airline industry profes-
sionals believe that if the Jones Act were repealed these airline protections might 
be eliminated as well, possibly causing the demise of the U.S. domestic airline 
industry, similarly to what happened to the maritime industry.30
9
McMahon: The Middle Kingdom Returns to the Sea, While America Turns Its Ba
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 M C M A H O N  8 9
Regarding port ownership and operation, whereas U.S. companies such as 
SeaLand Services once operated containership ports around the world, that 
company, like many U.S.-flag shipping companies, ceased to operate when it was 
purchased by a foreign-owned company. The ports and terminals once owned by 
SeaLand now are owned or operated by foreign port operators. The only U.S. port 
operator with terminal operations outside the United States is SSA Marine, which 
operates slightly more than a dozen terminals in ports around the world, in ad-
dition to its North American terminals. However, nearly half the interests in SSA 
are held by foreign nationals.31 In a reversal from the past, numerous foreign port 
operators and interests have purchased or leased control of many ports and ter-
minals in the United States, which has caused national-security concerns.32 The 
United States no longer is involved in crucial maritime infrastructure in other 
countries. For example, there is little or no U.S. involvement in the Panama Ca-
nal; a Chinese company operates ports and terminals on both ends of the canal.33
In short, if a maritime power is defined as a nation possessing a powerful 
navy, a sizable merchant marine, and capable maritime industries such as ship-
building—a definition propounded by Alfred Thayer Mahan—then the United 
States clearly is no longer a maritime power. Instead, the United States probably 
is described better as a maritime-dependent nation, and likely is defined even 
better as a maritime nation that soon will be dependent on the Chinese maritime 
industry.
THE MIDDLE KINGDOM—HISTORICALLY A MARITIME POWER?
Understandably, given its huge terrestrial presence in Eurasia, for much of its his-
tory China primarily has been viewed as a continental nation. However, China 
also has had a strong maritime connection and has a rich maritime past. Geog-
raphy encourages China to look toward the sea, particularly in the south, where 
mountains block easy access to the interior and there are thousands of populated 
islands off the coast. For centuries, southern seaboard provinces and islands have 
had large populations, but a dearth of available land has made it difficult to sup-
port those populations locally, making the sea critical for transportation, trade, 
fishing, and communication with other Chinese regions.34
Today, China’s land border is 13,743 miles long, and the country abuts four-
teen other nations. Through its thousands of years of history, China has pursued 
countless wars of both aggression and defense against its many neighbors. Most, 
but by no means all, of these wars have been fought primarily with land forces. 
But China also has more than nine thousand miles of saltwater coastline, thou-
sands of offshore islands, and several major rivers that connect to the sea, and 
the majority of the nation’s population always has resided in coastal regions. 
Therefore China, to varying degrees, always has kept an eye on its maritime 
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interests. Chinese naval warfare began as early as the tenth century BCE and was 
common during the Warring States period (475‒221 BCE). One story holds that 
in 471 BCE the great Chinese philosopher Confucius sought a leadership position 
with the Kingdom of Yue but was turned down because he lacked knowledge of 
naval operations.35
Throughout most of its very long history, China has been a major manufactur-
ing power, oftentimes the world leader. For thousands of years countries across 
the Eurasian landmass have sought Chinese goods. The long, overland passage 
called the Silk Road emerged as the major east–west trading route in the fourth 
century BCE.36 Over the centuries that followed, the Silk Road continued to be a 
major trading route between China and the Middle East, and even to Europe; 
Chinese goods found their way to the Roman Empire. Eventually, the Silk Road 
expanded to include seagoing routes across the Indian Ocean to Middle East-
ern and African ports. In his book China as a Sea Power 1127‒1368, author Lo 
Jung-pang notes that “China tried to become a seapower (in centuries past); in 
particular, during the Qin and Han dynasties and later during the Sui and Tang 
dynasties.” He further notes that during the three centuries from the Southern 
Song to the early Ming period (twelfth century CE to fourteenth century CE), the 
maritime and overseas activities of the Chinese were so great that China was 
more of a sea power than a land power. It was by using its naval and maritime 
power, across many centuries, that China went abroad to trade, and even to colo-
nize other Asian lands.37
Chinese maritime power in centuries past reached its height during the 
first Ming period (1405‒33), and especially during the reign of the third Ming 
emperor, Yongle (1402‒24). He dispatched the renowned military commander 
Zheng He (1371‒1433), known as the “Ming admiral.” From 1405 to 1433, Zheng 
completed seven extraordinary voyages, during which he sailed with as many as 
250 ships and upward of thirty thousand men to destinations in southern Asia, 
the Middle East, and East Africa.38
The main purposes of these military-oriented voyages were to expand Chinese 
influence throughout the Indian Ocean area and the Middle East, seek tribute 
for the Chinese court from local rulers, expand Chinese cultural influence, and 
improve trade. According to Naval War College professor Andrew Wilson, a key 
difference between European and Chinese efforts to seek trade during the early 
European age of exploration is that the Ming voyages did not seek trade so much 
as “the gravitational pull of the Chinese market (from these voyages) brought 
trade to [China]”—a phenomenon seemingly similar to the dynamic favoring 
China in the twenty-first century.39
During the Ming period, China’s navy and merchant marine clearly were the 
largest and most powerful in the world, and their sphere of influence expanded 
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wherever Zheng’s fleet landed. At the time, Chinese maritime technology far 
surpassed that of the Europeans. For example, the Chinese invented the compass 
and the rudder, which were huge innovations that enabled mariners to navigate 
and control vessels better on long voyages. Zheng’s fleet included ships over four 
hundred feet in length. (By comparison, Columbus’s Santa María was somewhere 
between sixty-two and eighty-five feet in length.) It is reasonable to assume that, 
had the Chinese wished to pursue ocean exploration and trade into the Atlantic 
and the Mediterranean and to Europe and even the Americas in the decades after 
Zheng’s voyages, they likely would have become the dominant maritime power 
on earth, eclipsing European efforts.40
For a complicated set of reasons, however, the Chinese abandoned their efforts 
to pursue great voyages beyond local Chinese waters after the death of Emperor 
Yongle. Following Admiral Zheng’s seventh and final voyage, the new Ming em-
peror had the fleet destroyed, after which harsh punishments were decreed and 
imposed on those who even attempted to trade beyond Chinese waters.41 One law 
imposed the death penalty for building a ship with more than two masts, and a 
later law did the same for a ship with more than one mast.42 In essence, except for 
coastal trade and fishing, the Chinese, under the second Ming dynasty, largely 
abandoned the ocean.
This happened at the time when European countries were on the cusp of the 
age of exploration that was made possible by the development of new maritime 
technologies—many of which were based on lessons learned from Chinese 
nautical technological innovations such as the compass and the rudder. As the 
Europeans came to dominate global trade in the seventeenth through nineteenth 
centuries, the Chinese would pay dearly for their lack of maritime power. Their 
navy was largely ineffective and they no longer possessed a capable merchant 
marine by which to trade with other nations. For centuries this enabled the Eu-
ropeans increasingly to impose countless demands on the Chinese and control 
Chinese seagoing trade, eventually resulting in “the century of shame” (extending 
from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century).43 This fact has 
not been lost on the leadership of the PRC in recent times, and it helps to explain 
why the Chinese have taken such great steps to become not only a global mari-
time power but the dominant maritime power in the world today.
European control of China’s seagoing trade continued into the twentieth cen-
tury, following the collapse of the Qing dynasty in the early 1900s.44 The world 
wars, Japanese occupation in the 1930s and ’40s, and the civil war between the 
Nationalists and Communists decimated the Chinese economy. Following World 
War II, virtually all Chinese seagoing trade, both foreign and domestic, was car-
ried in foreign-owned and -flagged ships. In 1950, the PRC merchant marine 
officially consisted of only seventy-seven ships, and the majority of these were 
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either unseaworthy or lying at the bottom of rivers and ports. Through the 1950s, 
China enjoyed a rather close relationship with the Soviet Union, and the Soviets 
encouraged Polish ships to carry Chinese seagoing trade; in fact, for many years 
the Polish merchant marine was China’s primary provider of ocean transporta-
tion. During these years, there actually were no Chinese-flag ships engaged in 
international trade. As far as PRC ports and shipyards went, the picture was 
equally dismal in the 1950s. There were no shipyards capable of building ocean-
going ships, and ports were hugely inefficient and few in number.45 The Chinese 
did not own, lease, or operate any port terminals outside the mainland.
Despite the poor condition of the Chinese maritime industry in the early years 
of the PRC, the Communist Party’s leadership fully grasped the importance of 
the industry and placed great emphasis on building a capable maritime industry 
in all sectors: ships, ports, shipyards, and mariners. It was clear to Mao Zedong’s 
government that China needed a domestic maritime industry, particularly in 
coastal and river trades to compensate for the poor quality of roads and rail-
roads.46 With Soviet maritime expertise and the use of Soviet-built equipment, 
particularly engines, China began building domestic ships in the early 1960s. The 
initial building rate reached ten ships a year in 1960, but this fell to two follow-
ing the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. The shipbuilding picture remained 
poor for many years because of the lack of Chinese technology and engineering 
capability and the inability to develop and build critical elements such as ship 
engines. In terms of ship ownership, in 1961 the state-owned China Ocean Ship-
ping Company (COSCO) was formed under the Ministry of Communications. 
COSCO owned and controlled vessels under both Chinese and foreign flags. (In 
the 1960s the PRC began relying on foreign flags to operate many Chinese-owned 
ships. At the time, this included use of the British and Somali flags.)47 The first 
voyage of a PRC-flag ship outside Asian waters was by SS Heping, which carried 
cargoes from China to the Republic of Guinea in West Africa in 1962. The Chi-
nese merchant marine continued to grow through the 1960s, reaching more than 
three hundred ships by the early 1970s. Shipbuilding during this period remained 
a very limited industry, particularly since China did not have the expertise to 
develop and build nautical equipment and engines.48
Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the PRC continued to emphasize 
the development of its maritime industries, including shipping, shipyards, and 
ports. The number of PRC ships engaged in international trade doubled during 
this period. More ships were added to the Chinese flag-of-convenience fleets, 
particularly using the Somali and eventually the Panamanian flags. During these 
years, PRC ships began “cross trading,” which involved carrying cargoes to and 
from ports other than China, and charging freight revenues in U.S. dollars, mak-
ing the practice a good source of hard currency. In 1978, the number of PRC ships 
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in international trade surpassed that of the United States, and by 1982 China’s 
merchant fleet ranked seventh in the world in size.49
Of particular note during these years was the development of China’s port and 
shipbuilding industries. Major efforts were undertaken to modernize Chinese 
shipyards, and with technical assistance from European, Japanese, and Singapor-
ean shipbuilders the Chinese began building ships for domestic and export mar-
kets. Costs per ship were so low and demand was so high that Chinese yards had 
to suspend order books until shipbuilding capacity could be increased. During 
this period, ports also radically improved in capacity and capability. From 1959 
to 1979, there was a 3,750 percent increase in cargo throughput in Chinese ports, 
but dock capacity had increased by only 30 percent. Given this serious situation, 
major efforts were undertaken to develop and build port infrastructure, includ-
ing the introduction of container-handling equipment.50 Through the next three 
decades, Chinese leaders continued to increase the capability and capacity of 
their maritime industries dramatically, in ship ownership, shipbuilding, port de-
velopment, and a multitude of related industries. Today, China’s maritime indus-
try, in all sectors, is the largest in the world by far, and it still is growing rapidly.
THE CHINESE MARITIME INDUSTRY TODAY
The PRC government’s decades-long support of the Chinese maritime industry 
has included substantial, even aggressive, financial subsidies, laws, and poli-
cies designed to enable all sectors of the industry to grow at phenomenal rates. 
Currently, with more than 5,500 merchant ships engaged in international trade, 
Chinese companies (including Hong Kong‒based companies) own more ships 
than those of any other nation on earth.51 Chinese container-shipping companies 
combined carry more containers than the world’s number one carrier, Maersk 
Line. This represents nearly 20 percent of all the containers carried by the top 
twenty carriers.52
Chinese companies own or operate more ports and terminals around the 
world than those of any other country.53 These Chinese companies include 
Hutchison Ports, COSCO Ports, China Merchants Ports, Shanghai International 
Port Group, and Qingdao Port International.54 In fact, by 2015 “two-thirds of 
the world’s top fifty container ports had some degree of Chinese investment 
in them, if not majority ownership and control, and this number is growing.” 
These ports handle 67 percent of the world’s shipping containers.55 Chinese port 
companies in all ports around the world handle 39 percent of the total volume 
of containers—nearly double the share of the next largest port operator, which 
is headquartered in Singapore.56 Of the top twenty ports in the world by cargo 
throughput (2016‒17), fourteen are located in China.57 Almost “under the radar,” 
Chinese port companies acquired 49 percent ownership in France’s CMA CGM 
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port operations, which has given Chinese companies operational control of 
Houston’s Terminal Link port and South Florida Container Terminal in Miami.58 
COSCO has long-term lease/operations stakes in the ports of Los Angeles and 
Seattle as well.59
By 2017, China was the number one shipbuilder in the world, as measured by 
the number of ships completed, new orders, and pending orders. Over 40 percent 
of the world’s commercial ships now are built in China, and this percentage is 
growing as shipyards in other countries no longer can compete and are shut-
tered.60 (Notably—and troubling from a USN perspective—during a mere eight-
year period, from 2009 to 2017, the Chinese developed and built eighty-three 
warships for the Chinese navy, which now is the second-largest navy in the world, 
and within a few decades or less is expected to be the largest.)61 With 150 modern 
cutters and hundreds of other vessels, the China Coast Guard is the largest such 
service in the world.62 Numbered at more than two hundred thousand vessels, 
China’s fishing fleet also is the largest in the world.63
One of the secrets of Chinese successes in the incredible growth of the nation’s 
maritime sector is the Chinese emphasis on maritime education—in nautical sci-
ence, marine engineering, and maritime business. More than 115,000 students 
attend the several Chinese maritime universities and colleges.64 Finally, China is a 
global leader in ship finance, providing funds for international shipping companies 
seeking to buy, build, or lease ships, particularly those from Chinese shipyards. In 
2008, no Chinese bank was listed in the top ten of the world’s shipbuilding-loan 
institutions; a decade later, the top two banks were Chinese—both state-owned 
institutions.65 By 2025, it is projected that Chinese banks will provide 50 percent 
of all shipbuilding loans.66 This means that, although China may not own or 
operate large numbers of the world’s commercial ships, it will have influence, if 
not control, over a majority of the world’s merchant fleet, because it will hold the 
mortgages on a major percentage of ships owned by companies in other countries.
China has made no attempt to hide its aspirations to influence, if not domi-
nate, the world’s maritime industry. In 2015, the Shanghai International Shipping 
Institute, a state-owned research institute, released a report, “China Shipping 
Development Outlook 2030.” The report offers several conclusions. First, “China 
will remain the largest cargo trader in the world and will take a dominant role 
in global container shipping.” Second, China will double its shipping engaged in 
worldwide trade and control at least 15 percent of that trade. To do this, China 
will become the number one shipowner in the world. (It already is.) Ship op-
erators will evolve to become “global logistics providers” (much like other large 
containership operators, such as Maersk). The report notes that privately owned 
Chinese shipping companies will account for “over 70% of China owned ships.” 
(However, this runs contrary to the current trend in China of state ownership, 
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which does not allow private-sector companies into the industry.) The report 
suggests that Chinese foreign-flag fleets will comprise upward of 90 percent of 
Chinese-owned ships. With regard to ports, the report notes that “throughput at 
Chinese ports will reach 505 million TEUs [twenty-foot-equivalent containers] 
by 2030.” Without providing specific metrics, the report indicates that “Chinese 
enterprises will build port networks around the globe, especially investing in 
port networks in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and 
other developing countries with strategic cooperation with China.” Finally, the 
report emphasizes China’s role as a global leader in ship financing and marine 
insurance.67
HOW CHINA IS REALIZING ITS MARITIME AMBITIONS: CHINESE 
MARITIME STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
China’s Qing dynasty ruled the country from 1636 to 1912, a period of gradual 
but persistent incursion by Europeans, and eventually by the Japanese, into 
Chinese trade and influence. The Opium Wars with the British in the mid-
nineteenth century saw Chinese military forces destroyed by the British, who 
then forced the Chinese to allow the British Empire to import opium into China 
in exchange for Chinese goods. Thus began “the century of shame,” during which 
Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan essentially carved China up into 
spheres of influence.68
Following the civil war in China that ended in 1949 with the defeat of Nation-
alist forces by Communist forces on the mainland and the establishment of the 
PRC, China’s economy was in complete shambles. For the next several decades, 
under the absolute rule of Chairman Mao, China essentially pursued a policy of 
isolationism and self-reliance under which the Chinese people were expected to 
produce agricultural and manufactured goods without the influence or assistance 
of outside nations.69 Mao’s policies further destroyed the Chinese economy and 
caused the death of untold millions of people by starvation.
Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping came to power and relent-
lessly pursued a policy of opening up China to the rest of the world by boldly 
seeking foreign investment and trade. Knowing that he could not abandon the 
façade of communist/socialist ideology, but likely knowing the failures of pure 
communism and socialism, Deng adhered to a strict policy of pursuing what he 
called “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”70 The Chinese Communist Party 
continues to use the phrase today. It is purposefully imprecise, but in broad terms 
it refers to an economy that the state essentially controls while allowing varying 
degrees of private investment and ownership.
Under Mao’s leadership, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were established in 
all sectors of the economy. These SOEs essentially operate as companies owned 
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by the state. SOEs, in China, typically are managed at a provincial or even mu-
nicipal level. Others are managed at the central government level by the State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).71 The 
problem—as is typical of many government organizations worldwide—is that 
SOEs, lacking financial incentives, are inherently inefficient and often become 
bloated with choking bureaucracies and unproductive workers.
Deng knew this, and therefore introduced market-based reforms, including 
the potential for private investment and ownership. Notably, Deng focused on 
commercial shipbuilding as a critical industry, and under his leadership in 1982 
the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) SOE was established. In 1999, 
a second SOE was formed out of CSSC: the China Shipbuilding Industry Corpo-
ration (CSIC). These two SOEs dominated shipbuilding in China.72 In 2019, they 
were reunited into one larger SOE.73
Over the decades since Deng, the role of SOEs has continued, with them ex-
ercising control over certain sectors of the Chinese economy but with private in-
vestment in SOEs being introduced to varying degrees and with varying success. 
(Of Chinese SOEs, 66 percent are listed on the Chinese stock exchange.) Today, 
privately owned companies actually employ more workers than SOEs, and these 
privately owned companies account for the majority of China’s gross domestic 
product (GDP).74 However, in certain sectors SOEs maintain absolute control. 
One such sector is the maritime industry, which China views as a strategic in-
dustry vital to the interests of the nation.75 Despite statements in 2015 from Jin 
Jiachen, a director at the Shanghai International Shipping Institute, that Chinese 
ocean-shipping companies would privatize to a large degree, there is little evi-
dence this has happened or will do so.76 Furthermore, under Chinese president 
Xi Jinping there is new emphasis on and support of SOEs and less interest in 
privatizing many industries, including Chinese maritime industries.77
COSCO is an SOE. The company operates a fleet of well over fifteen hundred 
vessels calling on over a thousand ports worldwide. The COSCO fleet includes 
most types of merchant ships, such as tankers, bulk ships, roll-on/roll-off (RO/
RO) vessels, and containerships. In 2015, COSCO merged with the SOE China 
Shipping Group, retaining the name of China COSCO Shipping Corporation.78 
COSCO expanded further in 2017 with the government-funded $6.7 billion 
acquisition of Orient Overseas Container Line (OOCL), a public company 
formerly based in Hong Kong. COSCO now is the third-largest containership 
operator in the world.79 Even before its acquisition of OOCL in 2017, COSCO for 
a time had taken the lead as the number one container-shipping company in the 
world. With its acquisition of OOCL and its continued aggressive expansion poli-
cies, it is quite possible that COSCO will take the number one spot in container 
shipping permanently.80
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For years, the global trend in the container-shipping business has been in-
creasing consolidation, leaving fewer and fewer container-shipping companies. 
China has taken full advantage of this trend, using the power of COSCO. A 
United Nations think tank associated with UNCTAD contends that there are now 
too few container-shipping companies left to ensure adequate competition.81 By 
mid-2018, the top ten container-shipping companies carried 75 percent of the 
world’s shipping containers, with COSCO as the number three carrier, carrying 
over 12 percent of the world’s containers. The UNCTAD report notes that the 
top container companies have formed three alliances that effectively are cartels. 
On the positive side, these alliances potentially reduce costs and rationalize ser-
vice, which can lower freight rates; on the other hand, according to UNCTAD, 
they instead can create a serious risk of establishing corporate oligopolies that 
will reduce competition and constrain service.82 The Ocean Alliance consists 
of COSCO and CMA CGM (of France); the 2M Alliance links Maersk (of Den-
mark) and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC, of Switzerland); THE Alli-
ance combines Hapag-Lloyd (of Germany), Yang Ming (of Taiwan), and ONE (of 
Japan). An effort by Maersk, MSC, and CMA CGM in 2014 to form an alliance 
to be known as the P3 Alliance was blocked by the Chinese government—a clear 
example of governmental intervention designed to support COSCO. Notably, in 
2015 the Export-Import Bank of China (CEXIM) agreed to provide a billion dol-
lars in loans or credit to the French CMA CGM to build new ships—in Chinese 
shipyards. Since that time, Chinese ties between COSCO and CMA CGM have 
continued to deepen.83
As noted earlier, in the port sector China is the global leader in owning, leas-
ing, and operating ports and terminals around the world. Most Chinese compa-
nies in the port and terminal business are SOEs; these include COSCO, Shanghai 
International Port Group, China Overseas Port Holdings, and China Shipping 
Group. China Merchants Holdings and Hutchison Port Holdings are additional 
Chinese companies engaged in global port ownership and operation that os-
tensibly are private companies but have Chinese government investment and 
oversight.84 In 2013, China Merchants purchased a 49 percent share of France’s 
CMA CGM’s Terminal Link, which operates in many countries, including the 
United States. Of particular note, reports in September 2019 indicated that China 
Merchants Holdings was in discussion with CMA CGM to invest further in that 
company’s port assets. These actions give rise to speculation, if not concern, 
regarding how much more of CMA CGM’s shipping and port operations the 
Chinese will purchase.85
China’s shipyard sector grew from the 1980s through the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, with some 1,647 shipyards built in China. By 2010, China 
had become the number one shipbuilder in the world.86 As noted earlier, the 
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largest Chinese SOEs in the shipbuilding business were CSSC and CSIC; they 
merged in 2019. Following the financial downturn in 2008, many Chinese 
private-sector shipyards went bankrupt, while the shipbuilding SOEs received 
massive government loans and subsidies. By 2014, three-quarters of all new or-
ders went to Chinese SOE shipyards.87
Despite possible, if not probable, inefficiencies within maritime SOEs, they 
enjoy numerous advantages over private-sector companies. They have easy access 
to huge loans and subsidies from the central government. In 2017, for example, 
the Chinese government announced it would invest $26 billion in COSCO over 
the five-year period ending in 2022. Given that COSCO already is number 
three in container shipping, an investment of $26 billion easily could propel the 
company into the number one spot, possibly leaving in its wake the bankruptcy 
of other major container-shipping lines, which already are becoming fewer in 
number each year owing to ongoing consolidation.88 In addition to the possible 
infusion of substantial state funds to help SOEs compete with private-sector Chi-
nese and international companies, SOEs also enjoy blanket protection in times of 
fiscal downturns and uncertainty, as well as huge preferences in terms of govern-
ment policies and regulatory treatment.
China can use its substantial market power in shipping to achieve dominance 
over its competitors. A classic example of this involves the Brazilian corporation 
Vale SA. Vale is a large iron-ore mining company based in Brazil. As a major 
consumer of iron ore, China has been a crucial customer of Vale for many years. 
No doubt to save transportation costs and better manage logistics to China, late 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century Vale’s leadership made the decision 
to build ultralarge iron-ore bulk carriers instead of chartering vessels to carry 
the company’s iron ore to China.89 Vale chose Chinese shipyards to build these 
vessels. However, when the vessels were completed and began carrying iron ore 
to China, Chinese officials would not let the Vale bulk ships enter Chinese ports, 
citing their immense size as a “safety issue.” Vale was forced to sell the vessels to 
COSCO, which in turn leased them back to Vale on long-term charter.90 Presum-
ably this somehow must have made the ships safer, because they then were al-
lowed to enter Chinese ports. This is a clear example of protectionism; COSCO’s 
leverage as an SOE prevented Vale from entering the trade except on terms that 
COSCO accepted.
Chinese government banking entities clearly support the Chinese maritime 
industry in all sectors, including shipping, ports, and shipbuilding. Huge sums 
of capital have been made available to the industry for projects that promote 
Chinese geostrategic goals, not merely normal business investment. The $26 
billion that Chinese banks provided to COSCO, mentioned earlier, is a good 
example of this. In 2017, the chairman of SASAC noted “the importance of SOEs 
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as a mechanism for the government to direct the economy and achieve political 
objectives.”91
THE “NEW SILK ROAD,” THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE— 
PART OF CHINA’S MARITIME STRATEGY
China has been an economic and manufacturing powerhouse for much of its 
very long history. Since ancient times, Chinese goods have found their way west 
via the overland Silk Road through Central Asia, and eventually they traveled 
across maritime trade routes through the Indian Ocean that were established by 
Arab traders. As noted earlier, over the period from the fifteenth century into 
the twentieth century Europeans gradually eclipsed Arab traders as European 
countries and companies took virtual control of all Chinese imports and exports, 
resulting in the “century of shame.” When the PRC was established in 1949, this 
clearly was a situation its government was determined to change. It has done so 
slowly but steadily through the decades since 1949.
At the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in 
2012, China for the first time “elevated the construction of a strong maritime 
country” to the level of a national goal.92 By 2013, China had become the world’s 
dominant commercial maritime industry leader. But far from being content with 
the country’s maritime achievements, President Xi announced in 2013 that the 
PRC would establish a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, later called the One 
Belt, One Road initiative, and eventually the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).93 The 
vast majority of BRI funding comes from Chinese policy banks (SOEs), such as 
the Chinese Development Bank and CEXIM, as well as large Chinese financial 
institutions, including the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Devel-
opment Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China, 
the China Construction Bank, and the Silk Road Fund. These institutions are 
state owned, or at least state controlled. To date, these Chinese financial institu-
tions have invested, or committed to do so, nearly one trillion dollars in loans for 
ports and terminals, railroads, power plants and grids, and other transportation-
related infrastructure.94 With little exaggeration, the BRI can be called the most 
expansive, aggressive, and costly transportation and infrastructure scheme ever 
developed in human history. Currently, thousands of BRI infrastructure projects 
already have been built, are under construction, or are in the planning stages.95
The Chinese have indicated that the BRI ultimately will involve a total of 
eight trillion dollars in investments in sixty-eight countries that are home to 65 
percent of the world’s population.96 Its two major initiatives are the Silk Road 
Economic Belt, an overland route to Europe via railroads and roads, and the Silk 
Road Maritime Road, an east–west route via the sea. While the BRI has both land 
and sea components, the maritime aspect is the dominant one by far. In 2016, 
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for example, 1,700 trains carried cargo from China to Europe via land corridors 
through Central Asia, carrying an estimated 150,000 containers. With BRI in-
vestments in these corridors, the Chinese estimate that in 2020 the number of 
containers carried by BRI roads and railroads will have risen to five hundred 
thousand. By comparison, the maritime sea routes from China to Europe in 
2014 alone carried some twenty-two million containers, and BRI investments 
along the Maritime Silk Road are projected to increase this number greatly in 
the years ahead.97 According to the Chinese government, there are three “blue 
passages,” or BRI maritime routes, one of which runs “from China to Africa 
and the Mediterranean, another to Oceania [in the Pacific] and South Pacific, 
and a third through the Arctic to Europe.”98 The BRI also includes projects in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Another major BRI initiative is known as the 
Digital Silk Road.99
President Xi has thrown the full weight of his leadership and reputation be-
hind the BRI, and it is hard to overemphasize the full implications of this mas-
sive initiative. The BRI may be an outgrowth of former Chinese president Jiang 
Zemin’s Going Out policy; however, it is much more prodigious in scale. At the 
Nineteenth Party Congress, in 2017, Xi projected that “by 2050, China will have 
become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international 
influence.” The BRI is a major factor enabling this evolution to happen at present, 
and that will continue to be so. Currently, China’s maritime industry—its “blue 
economy”—already represents 10 percent of the country’s GDP, and this number 
will increase as maritime BRI projects reach fruition.100
China’s public statements on the BRI note “that BRI will greatly benefit hu-
mankind and create a new era of world trade and globalization.”101 According to 
the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, the purpose of the BRI is to “promote 
policy coordination (between countries), connectivity of infrastructure, unim-
peded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds.” Xinhua goes 
further to suggest that, among other things, the BRI “will improve the marine 
environment, promote development and eradicate poverty, enhance cooperation 
on marine resource utilization, upgrade marine industry cooperation, facilitate 
maritime transport, strengthen connectivity of information and networks, im-
prove security and search and rescue, and create innovative growth.”102 These are 
lofty goals, and it can be argued that there is some truth in many of these claims.
It is important to understand, however, that from a Chinese perspective the 
BRI has many additional advantages. Successful efforts under the BRI will in-
crease export markets for China, which means more money and jobs in China. 
BRI projects themselves provide jobs for Chinese construction companies and 
tens of thousands of Chinese construction workers, since one of the prerequisites 
for a country to accept BRI funding is to employ Chinese construction companies 
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and allow Chinese workers to build the targeted infrastructure in whatever 
country receives the BRI loans.103 In BRI port projects, Chinese companies 
and workers provide everything: finance, design, construction, operation, even 
dredging.104 The Chinese construction companies that build BRI infrastructure 
are almost all SOEs, such as the China Communications Construction Com-
pany, the China Harbor Engineering Company, and the China Road and Bridge 
Corporation.105
However, there are many drawbacks and concerns regarding BRI. Some ana-
lysts conclude that in many cases BRI is nothing more than a “debt trap.” Poorer 
nations that accept BRI infrastructure funding eventually become unable to 
fulfill debt payments, resulting in Chinese takeover of the infrastructure. A 2018 
study completed by the Center for Global Development noted that “twenty-three 
countries are at risk of debt distress as a result of BRI loans from China.”106 The 
port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka is a clear example of this. The Sri Lankan gov-
ernment received a Chinese BRI loan of one billion dollars to build a new port. 
By 2017, Sri Lanka was unable to repay the loan. This resulted in China obtaining 
a ninety-nine-year lease to control the port completely.107 In another instance, in 
October 2019 the following was noted in testimony before the U.S. Congress: “In 
2019, the Kenyan newspaper Daily Nation reported it had obtained a leaked copy 
of the agreement between China and Kenya for the construction [under BRI] of 
the Mombasa–Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway Project. According to Kenyan 
media, the contract states that China could take possession of the port of Mom-
basa should the Kenyan National Railway Corporation default on its $2.2 billion 
repayments to China’s Exim Bank.”108
Chinese loans often are provided at a higher interest rate than comparable 
loans from other countries and sources. The Chinese SOE banks are successful 
in securing these loans at the higher rates because, in most cases, for a variety of 
reasons, funds would not be available from any other source. In some cases, Chi-
nese loans are sought because they do not come with the specific requirements 
(“strings”) attached that other sources, such as the World Bank, often impose 
on those seeking a loan. In the case of the port of Hambantota, for example, no 
competitors were interested in providing Sri Lanka a loan.109
There are also real fears (and examples) of BRI funding leading to local cor-
ruption. Chinese companies involved in BRI projects have been “accused of 
corruption and collusion with local politicians in Equatorial Guinea, Malaysia, 
and Bangladesh, among many other countries.”110 The BRI SOE China Com-
munications Construction Company and all its subsidiaries have been shown, 
in multiple instances, to have used bribes to officials and their families in many 
countries where the company and its subsidiaries had business or planned to 
conduct business.111
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Perhaps most troubling are the political influence and favors that Chinese 
authorities demand in exchange for BRI funding.112 Via such funding in 2016, 
China’s SOE COSCO obtained a controlling interest (51 percent) in the port of 
Piraeus in Greece; this proportion was due to increase to 67 percent in 2020.113 It 
comes as little surprise that in 2017 Greece and Hungary (also a recipient of BRI 
funding) vetoed a “joint EU [European Union] statement criticizing China based 
on human rights.” The year before, both countries had refused to sign a joint EU 
statement that criticized China’s actions in the South China Sea.114
In some cases, BRI projects have failed to produce tangible benefits for coun-
tries even while at the same time saddling them with debt. Vanuatu is a case in 
point. Under the BRI, the Chinese constructed a new cruise-ship pier in the coun-
try, at a cost of one hundred million dollars. Once completed, however, the new fa-
cility failed to meet expectations and adversely affected the country’s economy.115
As Forbes notes, “there are often some key differences between how Chinese 
maritime companies operate internationally and what their projects look and 
feel like. . . . While China’s new array of port holdings are fundamentally eco-
nomically motivated projects, there is a glaring political dimension as well.” By 
controlling major ports in key countries, China maintains more control over its 
import and export supply chains. Through investment and ownership, China 
in many cases can exercise political influence over other countries and help en-
sure that these countries stay friendly to Chinese interests. According to Forbes, 
“China is creating a new paradigm in the twenty-first century where economic 
leverage is the key.”116 In African countries, through loans and BRI investments, 
China has gained considerable political leverage. In Djibouti, for example, China 
holds over 80 percent of the nation’s debt. In Zambia, it is reported that China will 
take over the power grid because of the country’s inability to pay back Chinese 
loans.117 Following the 2008 financial crisis, Iceland was in serious financial peril 
as a result of banking failures. In response to this, and in the absence of EU and 
U.S. support, Iceland accepted Chinese loans and investments that stabilized the 
economy. Since that time, Chinese-Icelandic relations have blossomed, which 
provides support for China’s BRI efforts in the Arctic.118
SUMMING UP THE THREATS FROM CHINESE  
MARITIME DOMINANCE
In all respects, China is a global power, and the United States and other countries 
can expect it to assert its interests, as is normal. However, as numerous observers 
have noted, in some industries China has acted in a particularly aggressive man-
ner, with a determination to dominate those industries globally. This certainly 
is the case with the maritime industry. While Chinese SOEs in the maritime 
industry certainly seek to make money, they also serve the political interests of 
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the Chinese state, and in some instances they take actions that result in expected 
financial losses because those actions serve the policy goals of the Chinese gov-
ernment. While it is true that Chinese initiatives such as the BRI stand to benefit 
dozens of countries and their populations in some ways, Chinese BRI funding 
and the related maritime dominance give China sizable political leverage and 
influence. According to Carolyn Bartholomew, chairman of the U.S.-China Eco-
nomic and Security Review Commission, a “major goal of BRI [and the concur-
rent dominance of China’s maritime shipping industry] is to open more markets 
for Chinese goods, displacing goods and services currently provided by the U.S. 
and other countries.”119 Since the United States has retreated almost completely 
from the global maritime industry through a lack of interest in U.S.-flag shipping 
and international port ownership and operation, Chinese goals of controlling ac-
cess to overseas markets have become ever easier to achieve.
As China’s maritime dominance in shipping, global port ownership, maritime 
finance, and shipbuilding continues to grow—as is expected and detailed in 
Chinese strategic plans and documents—China concurrently will gain politi-
cal power and influence. It would be naive to think this will not affect nations 
around the world, including the United States and members of the EU. One 
only need consider the recent debacle that occurred during the summer of 2019 
when a National Basketball Association (NBA) general manager expressed sup-
port for protesters in Hong Kong. The government in Beijing was outraged and 
demanded an apology. The situation threatened the NBA’s multibillion-dollar 
business in China. The result: the NBA backpedaled. The association released a 
statement in English that “affirmed both Beijing’s concerns and the league’s sup-
port for individuals educating themselves and sharing their views on matters of 
importance to them.” But—unbeknownst to most people—the NBA also issued 
a different statement in Mandarin that stated, “We are extremely disappointed in 
the inappropriate comments by the General Manager.”120 Similarly, a flight atten-
dant working for a subsidiary of Cathay Pacific, an airline based in Hong Kong, 
voiced her support for the Hong Kong protesters. The PRC government ordered 
the airline to dismiss the flight attendant, and it did so.121 While these events 
were relatively minor, one only can imagine the demands that China could make 
on countries, including the United States, given further dominance in the global 
maritime industry. In 2016, for example, the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia, which 
greatly displeased the Chinese. So China closed its border with Mongolia—which 
is landlocked. This severely affected Mongolia’s economy.122 In yet another ex-
ample of Chinese bullying, a November 2019 New York Times article noted that 
Chinese officials recently had been outraged with the Czech Republic. Develop-
ing relations between the two countries and massive Chinese “investment, trade, 
and business deals” had prompted the Czech president to declare that “the Czech 
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Republic would become China’s gateway to Europe.” All was well until various 
events caused Czech leaders to question the commitment their country had made 
to the “one China” policy, and even to venture to demonstrate support for Taiwan. 
The result was soured relations with the Chinese, who then backed away from 
PRC-Czech business deals. China even implemented a policy restricting Chinese 
tourists from visiting Prague.123 Recent history is replete with other examples of 
China bullying countries and companies, including firms in the United States, 
into complying with its wishes—“or else.” Increasing dominance in the global 
maritime industry through ship and port ownership, maritime financing, and 
BRI funding will ensure the Chinese have ever-increasing leverage to do the 
same in the decades ahead. Meanwhile, the United States stands idly by. As far as 
international shipping and port operations are concerned, the United States has 
absolutely no leverage at all. What is worse is that lack of action on the part of the 
United States clearly threatens America’s global trade.
Chinese control in the global maritime industry is the result of aggressive stra-
tegic planning coupled with favorable government policies backed by the power 
of SOEs and subsidies and other forms of government funding. There simply is 
no way for private-sector companies in the global industry to compete with this 
on their own. No matter what the economic conditions, SOEs have access to 
massive capital that the private sector simply cannot marshal. Further, to protect 
SOEs, the Chinese government can restrict outsiders’ ability to compete and can 
enact laws and implement other policies that benefit its SOEs—and it has done 
so. The Chinese have shown themselves to be masters at this as they developed 
and promoted their maritime industries over decades.
A major concern is that the global maritime industry has been consolidating 
in all sectors, meaning that with each passing year there are fewer and fewer com-
panies in all sectors of the industry. This is true in shipbuilding, ship operation, 
and port ownership and operation, despite the fact that the industry continues to 
grow as the global economy becomes more integrated.
Container shipping is but one powerful example of this. Forty years ago, 
it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to identify all the ocean ship-
ping companies that operated freight vessels carrying global trade; there were 
hundreds of such concerns, including dozens of U.S.-flag companies. Today, 
container-shipping companies carry some 60 percent of all seagoing trade, and 
there are many more and larger vessels carrying freight (now mostly in shipping 
containers). But the number of companies has been reduced drastically through 
acquisitions and mergers. In early 2018, the top fifteen containership operators 
carried 70 percent of the global trade; just six months later the number had been 
reduced to ten companies carrying the same portion of the trade.124 In 2019, the top 
five companies carried the majority of shipping containers.125 In order by size, these 
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were A.P. Moller / Maersk (Danish), Mediterranean Shipping Company (Swiss), 
COSCO (Chinese), CMA CGM (French, with an association with COSCO), and 
Hapag-Lloyd (German). The existence of fewer and fewer companies restricts 
competition and can affect service. As noted in an earlier section, UNCTAD 
contends that too few container-shipping companies remain to ensure adequate 
competition.126
To make matters worse, the companies noted above operate within only three 
shipping alliances, which also include smaller companies. These shipping alliances 
are essentially cartels, thereby further restricting competition. These alliances—
the 2M Alliance, the Ocean Alliance, and THE Alliance—together control 91 
percent of global container shipping.127 The large numbers of megacontainerships 
built over the past few years or on order have created overcapacity that will linger 
for many years. This has resulted, and for the foreseeable future will continue to 
result, in lower freight rates, which could force other companies out of business, 
spurring even more consolidation in the industry.128 The largest of the container-
ship operators, Maersk, even has suggested that severe competition will result in 
only three large companies carrying the vast majority of global trade in contain-
ers—no doubt with China’s COSCO being one of those three, if not number one.129
The presence of fewer and fewer companies in any industry tends to result in 
higher costs to consumers and poorer service. As COSCO takes more control 
over the world’s container shipping, the Chinese government will gain more and 
more political leverage over countries that rely on its container-shipping services 
and port ownership and operation for their international trade. Economic theory 
suggests that if there are too few companies in an industry, such that service and 
pricing affect consumers adversely, new companies will form to enter the indus-
try, improve competition, and positively affect costs and service.
Unfortunately, this will not happen in the ocean shipping industry—unless 
host governments subsidize the new companies. Entering the global shipping 
industry, particularly container shipping, requires billions of dollars and many 
years to build vessels, establish service, and obtain port and intermodal con-
nections. It would take years to receive positive returns on investment, and the 
likelihood of positive returns would be questionable in any case. In other words, 
the likelihood of attracting investors to form new container-shipping companies 
is poor, given the economics and time considerations involved.
Still another concern is the current profit margins in container shipping. One 
of the reasons the industry has consolidated is that in trying to compete and in 
building large fleets of megacontainerships, freight rates have been driven down, 
which has pushed companies and investors out of the industry, fueling ongoing 
mergers and acquisitions that have reduced the number of companies drastically. 
Naturally, investors are motivated by profits, and if profits are lacking there is an 
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understandable desire to sell unprofitable assets and move on to greener pastures. 
With the power of subsidies and other forms of government financing as well 
as favorable legislation and policy assistance, Chinese SOEs in shipping and the 
maritime industry at large can weather financial storms and economic down-
turns. They further have the funding and capability to buy out private-sector 
companies during economic downturns. Yes, Chinese SOEs, like private-sector 
companies, are motivated by profit, but they also are motivated by Chinese gov-
ernment policy and political ambitions.
This all makes for a potentially dangerous situation as far as the global 
container-shipping industry is concerned. For example, A.P. Moller / Maersk is a 
public company owned largely by the Maersk family and other investors; MSC is 
completely privately owned, by a Swiss family; and CMA CGM is a public com-
pany owned by investors, as is Hapag-Lloyd. What will happen if global container 
rates, already depressed, reach a point at which shipping families and investors 
grow tired of poor profit margins and decide to withdraw from the business to 
put their funds into more-profitable ventures? In December 2018, Moody’s cut 
Maersk’s credit rating—already not the best—from Baa2 to Baa3, “which is at 
the bottom of the investment grade bond rating.”130 In the fall of 2019, CMA 
CGM reported a second straight quarterly loss and, as was noted earlier, previ-
ously had sold 49 percent of its global port-operations entity, Terminal Link, to 
a Chinese company to reduce its debt. (There are no data on the second-largest 
container-shipping company, MSC, because it is entirely privately owned by a 
Swiss family.) In total, container shipping worldwide is on shaky ground, and 
further consolidation is likely. This author speculates that the Chinese govern-
ment, through COSCO and other Chinese companies, will be more than happy 
to purchase any containership companies that fail. This happened as recently as 
2017, when COSCO purchased the 150-year-old OOCL. So further consolida-
tion in the container-shipping industry is possible, with China benefiting and 
COSCO taking even more dominant control of the global industry, which will 
result in greater leverage, political and otherwise, for the Chinese government.
Throughout, this article has referred numerous times to how the Chinese 
government subsidizes the country’s maritime industries in every sector, and the 
degree to which it does so. This is despite the fact that in 2001 China became a 
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO rules expressly pro-
hibit government subsidies.131 In the maritime sector, the Chinese simply ignore 
these WTO rules, and apparently the rest of the world acquiesces. One Harvard 
study indicated that in the shipbuilding industry alone China subsidized ship-
yard costs by between 13 and 20 percent from 2006 through 2016.132 It is clear 
that vast Chinese government funding has been provided to ocean-shipping gi-
ant COSCO as well. Given the implied acceptance of this by the rest of the world 
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and on the basis of past performance, there is no reason to expect the Chinese to 
stop subsidizing their maritime industries. One might argue that Chinese gov-
ernment subsidies of the country’s maritime industry benefit other nations and 
people by providing lower-cost shipping, but subsidies distort the market and 
ultimately can result in the creation of oligopolies or even monopolies, which 
then can dictate service and costs, and in the case of China can exert political 
influence as well.
While China merely is poised to dominate the world’s container shipping, 
it already dominates shipbuilding and global port ownership and operation. 
For decades, the top three shipbuilding countries in the world have been Japan, 
Korea, and China. Over 40 percent of the world’s commercial ships now are 
built in China, and this percentage is growing as shipyards in other countries no 
longer can compete and so cease to operate.133 China is the global leader in ship 
finance by providing funds for international shipping companies seeking to buy 
and build ships, particularly in Chinese shipyards.134 This means that, although 
China may not own or operate large numbers of the world’s commercial ships, it 
has influence, if not control, over more than just Chinese-owned ships, because 
it holds the mortgages on a major percentage of ships owned or operated by com-
panies throughout the world. In 2017, for example, Chinese SOE banks provided 
ship-construction loans of over twenty billion dollars, primarily for construction 
in Chinese shipyards. Chinese strategic plans call for China to increase its leader-
ship in ship-construction financing in the decades ahead.135
From a military point of view, in 2015 the Chinese government issued new 
guidelines to Chinese shipping companies and shipyards, Technical Standards for 
New Civilian Ships to Implement National Defense Requirements. These guidelines 
lay out construction and equipment requirements to ensure that Chinese ships 
can support the forces of the People’s Liberation Army, including the People’s Lib-
eration Army Navy (PLAN). These guidelines pertain to containerships, RO/RO 
vessels, bulk ships, and general-cargo ships.136 These measures will give China—as 
the number one shipowner in the world, with thousands of ships under its con-
trol—unparalleled strategic sealift capabilities, if not greater overt military power.
Also a matter of concern is the possibility that ports that China constructs or 
operates under a BRI initiative ultimately may be used by its military, particularly 
the PLAN. The Chinese already have constructed and are using a PLAN base 
in Djibouti. In July 2019, the Chinese defense minister commented that “China 
is willing to deepen military exchanges and cooperation with the Caribbean 
countries and Pacific island countries under the framework of OBOR [BRI].” 
Chinese laws compel Chinese companies and SOEs to comply with requests and 
demands from Chinese security and intelligence organizations and the military. 
This enables these agencies to have global and easy access to intelligence in 
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the sixty-eight countries receiving BRI funding and throughout the thousands 
of other maritime and BRI projects. Chinese intelligence agencies will benefit 
further as BRI funds are made available to install Huawei 5G equipment in BRI 
ports and terminals throughout the world.137 When COSCO gained ownership 
and control in the Greek port of Piraeus, for example, the company replaced the 
network infrastructure with all-Huawei equipment.138
Senior U.S. military personnel and members of Congress have raised the con-
cern that Chinese dominance in the port industry around the world ultimately 
could restrict access to critical ports the U.S. Navy needs. Chinese intelligence 
agencies’ obvious penetration into these ports will affect U.S. military interests 
and security adversely.139 Might China, through its BRI funding or through 
bribes, demand that foreign governments deny access to the U.S. military? It is a 
very real possibility. Djibouti, for example, has been a recipient of BRI funding, 
and China holds the majority of Djibouti’s debt. As noted, the country now has a 
PLAN military base. Djibouti also happens to be an important logistics hub for 
the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Central Command. Might the Djiboutian government 
restrict or deny USN access to this base as a result of Chinese influence, funding, 
or bribes?140 Might this same tactic be used in other regions of the world where 
the U.S. Navy and other elements of the U.S. military operate?
In 2015, Michael P. Pillsbury, the director of the Center on Chinese Strategy at 
the Hudson Institute, authored a book, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s 
Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower. The title supplies 
the book’s thesis. The author is not only a China expert but a fluent speaker and 
writer of Mandarin, which gives him particular insights into what the Chinese 
really are thinking. As he frequently notes in the book, the Chinese often say 
one thing in an English text but something completely different in the Chinese 
version of the same text. With this approach, the Chinese often are able to fool 
Western scholars, journalists, and political leaders who do not read and write 
Mandarin about what their true motives are. In fact, Pillsbury notes that one of 
the main strategies the Chinese have used throughout their history has been to 
deceive others about their true intentions. The ancient Chinese military thinker 
Sun-tzu, for example, emphasized the importance of deception more than any 
other military doctrine.141
Yet as the Chinese have become the world leader in all aspects of the global 
maritime industry, including ship ownership, port and terminal ownership 
and operations, shipbuilding, ship finance, and maritime education, they have 
demonstrated plainly their intention to use the maritime industry to further the 
strategic, economic, and political goals of the PRC. Dominance in the maritime 
industry, along with concurrent multitrillion-dollar efforts through the BRI, 
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will give China truly unparalleled power. The Chinese clearly are trying to sell a 
positive message—that these efforts are designed “to kindle a new era of global-
ization, a golden age of commerce that will benefit all. . . . As Western countries 
move backwards by erecting walls, China is contriving to build bridges, both 
literal and metaphorical.”142 And to be sure, there are positive aspects to what the 
Chinese are doing. China’s decades-long dominance in manufacturing has pro-
vided the world with a plethora of consumer goods at moderate prices, which has 
raised the standard of living for people around the world. Not surprisingly, the 
Chinese are pursuing maritime ambitions as a source of revenue, trade, and jobs 
for the Chinese people as well. These alone are not nefarious actions. Still, huge 
Chinese maritime SOEs with access to massive government funds and subsidies 
and the protection of Chinese laws and policies give the Chinese government 
astonishing political leverage and control—on a scale potentially greater than 
anything seen in human history.
There are those in the EU and the United States who have expressed concerns 
over BRI and the global dominance of the Chinese maritime industry. But these 
voices are too few and too often essentially have been ignored, leaving a lack 
of action by Western governments. If the Chinese are not “secretly planning to 
replace the U.S. as the global superpower,” as Pillsbury suggests, they seemingly 
are attempting something very close to it. Their actions prove this, and the West’s 
inaction makes their success more possible every day. The time is long overdue 
for the United States to reinvigorate its maritime industries and challenge the 
Chinese in the same game by using the very same techniques the Chinese have 
used to gain dominance in the global maritime industry. The private-sector 
maritime industry cannot do this alone—the U.S. maritime industry simply can-
not compete against the power of the Chinese state. The United States and allied 
governments must bring to bear substantial and sustained political action, poli-
cies, and financial support. To do anything less is to cede control of the world’s 
maritime industry and global supply chains to China, and perhaps to force the 
United States and its allies to enter their own “century of shame.”
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